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Abstract  
 
 The aim of this paper is to contribute to throw some light on the main 
differences/similarities and dynamics in institutional frameworks, regional/sectoral features and 
economic performance in the eight transition countries that became EU members in May 2004 (8-
CEECs). 
 In the second section, a partial review of the main theoretical and empirical literature on the 
"great transformation" (Kornai, 2006) is presented, with a particular attention to the researches 
focusing on the relationship between institutional change and economic performance and to the 
studies considering some regional features of the transition processes.  
 Some stylized facts for the eight CEECs are presented in the third section, by distinguishing 
(i) initial conditions, (ii) institutional changes and progress in transition and (iii) economic 
performance (GDP growth, unemployment and employment rates, etc.). 
 In the forth section, the empirical results on some regional (NUTS 3) features (convergence, 
concentration and specialisation) of the 8-CEECs are discussed. 
 Finally, an attempt to econometrically investigate some determinants of regional income 
convergence and national GDP and employment dynamics is presented in the fifth section, by 
highlighting the role of institutional change and some regional features. 
 The main policy implications, concerning both European and national economic policies, are 
presented in the conclusive section.  
 
 
JEL Classification:  P52, R11, P25, P27  
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1. Introduction  
 The aim of the paper is to empirically investigate some key characters of the institutional 
changes, regional/sectoral dynamics and aggregate performances in the eight transition countries 
that became EU members in May 2004 (8-CEECs). We consider the period 1989-2006 and we use 
data from many sources (Cambridge Econometrics, Eurostat, EBRD, World Bank, etc.). 
 The paper has the following structure. In the second Section, a partial review of the main 
theoretical and empirical literature on transition is presented, by distinguishing the relationship 
between institutional change and aggregate performance from the analysis of the regional features 
of labour market dynamics and economic growth.  
 Some stylized facts for the eight CEECs are presented in the third Section, by considering: 
(i) initial economic and institutional conditions, (ii) institutional changes and reform policies and 
(iii) aggregate performance (GDP growth, unemployment and employment rates, etc.) and sigma 
convergence dynamics.  
 In the forth section, the empirical results on some regional (NUTS 3) features (convergence, 
concentration and specialisation) of the 8-CEECs are discussed.  
 An econometric investigation on some determinants of regional income convergence, 
national GDP and employment dynamics is presented in the fifth section, by highlighting the role of 
institutional change.  
 Finally, the main conclusions and policy implications are presented.  
 
2. Institutional change, regional features and aggregate performance: a partial review of the 
literature on the “Great Transformation” 
 The complexity and peculiarities of the transformation that has taken place in the Central 
and Eastern European Countries since the collapse of the Berlin Wall (1989) are well described in a 
long-run historical/comparative perspective by Kornai (2006). In particular, Kornai highlighted that 
the world history has been characterised by other "great transformations" (Polanyi, 1944), but he 
showed that the transformation in Central and Eastern European Countries is the only one in the 
world history presenting the following six characteristics: (i and ii) the changes follow the main 
direction of development in Western civilisation: in the economic sphere in the direction of the 
capitalist economic system, and in the political field in the direction of democracy; (iii) there was a 
complete transformation, parallel in all spheres: in the economy, in the political structure, in the 
world of political ideology, in the legal system and in the stratification of society; (iv) the 
transformation was non-violent; (v) the process of transformation took place under peaceful 
circumstances; it was not preceded by war; the changes were not forced upon society as a result of 
foreign military occupation; (vi) the transformation took place with incredible speed, within a time-
frame of ten to fifteen years1. 
 In this section, a partial review of the huge literature on the “great transformation” is 
presented, by focusing only on some crucial aspects of the following two sub-topics: (i) the 
relationship between institutional change/transition and economic/employment performance and (ii) 
the regional2 features of the transition processes. It should be noted that the vast theoretical and 
empirical literature produced on the first topic has not been followed, until now, by a similar 
development of the second one, especially at the NUTS 3 level and as regards the attempt to jointly 
investigate institutional change and regional features in order to contribute to the explanation of 
comparative economic performance in transition countries. 
 
 
                                                 
1 He also stated that “... the biggest difference can be discerned, of course in characteristic (vi), the speed of the change. It took 
capitalism centuries to become the prevalent economic system of an entire country. A centuries-long process preceded the realisation 
of parliamentary democracy. By contrast, all of these have been completed with incredible speed in the Central Eastern European 
region now. From the perspective of large-scale history, the transformation of the Central Eastern European region was indeed 
extremely swift. But it is important to recall that there were politicians and economic experts who urged even faster changes.” 
2 We define as "regional" the sub-national levels. 
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2.1. Institutional change, transition and aggregate performance 
 The “transformational recession and unemployment”3 was largely unexpected by 
economists and a rapidly increasing theoretical and empirical literature emerged4. The remarkable 
focus on the role of institutions and institutional change5 was mainly due to the enormous 
difficulties in finding explanations of the (differences in the) economic performance of transition 
countries by using (only) the traditional neoclassical approaches and instruments (partly adopted in 
development economics)6. 
 As well known, a large theoretical and empirical economic literature analysed the 
importance of institutions and the role of “institutional change”, partly focusing on the effects on 
uncertainty (e.g.: Armen 1950; Hirschman 1970; North 1990, 1994 and 2000; Keefer and Knack 
1995; Burki and Perry 1998; Dewatripont and Roland 1995; Mehta et al. 1999; Blanchard 2000; 
Hodgson 2000). In addition, as for transition economies, the crucial role of institutions (initial 
institutional conditions and institutional changes), has been largely recognised and analysed not 
only by “heterodox economists” but also by IFIs and “mainstream economists” (e.g. Fisher and 
Sahay 2004)7.  
 In this sub-section we briefly review a part of the vast theoretical and empirical literature on 
the relationship between institutions/institutional change and economic performances in transition 
countries8, by mainly considering the “methodological/empirical approach” followed in some 
selected papers9 distinguished according to the main focus on: (i) the role of initial institutional 
conditions and reform/institutional policies, (ii) the speed of transition and (iii) the use of wider 
definitions of institutions and institutional change10. 
 In the first group, De Melo et al. (1997) focused on the role of initial conditions and policies 
(liberalisation) in explaining economic outcomes (in terms of growth and inflation) in some (groups 
of) transition countries11, by considering many (mainly) economic and geographic variables (initial 
level of development, urbanisation, industrial distortion, geographic location, repressed inflation, 
trade distortion, black market exchange rate premium) together with two strictly institutional initial 
variables (a categorical variable according to characteristics of State formation and a variable of 
“market memory” measured by the years under central planning). The authors, starting from the non 
linear relationship between initial conditions, economic liberalisation and performance (De Melo et 
al., 1996, and Selowsky and Martin, 1997), investigate the relative importance over time of initial 
conditions and policies. Fisher and Sahay (2004) produced an empirical analysis on the 
determinants of output performance in 25 transition countries by considering some institutional 
development variables (reform index12 and State capture index13) together with an initial conditions 
                                                 
3 The generally huge GDP decline in early years of transition was accompanied and followed by high and persistent unemployment 
rates in many countries. 
4 The extremely different policy suggestions of that literature were an evident sign of the “unpreparedness of economic profession for 
the task of transition” (Ferragina and Pastore 2006). 
5 Cornia and Popov (1995) argued that “the success of the overall reform efforts depends to a considerable extent on the existence of 
adequate institutions ...”. Raiser (1997) stated that what transitions is all about is a redesign of the institutional framework of 
formerly centrally planned economies and, therefore, a transition theory will necessary be a theory of institutional change. 
6 Stiglitz (1994) draw attention to the weakness of the neoclassical model of a market economy as a basis for advising transition 
governments on appropriate reform strategies.  
7 However, it is interesting to note that Fisher and Sahay “argue that the charge that the IFIs did not take account of the importance 
of institutional development, especially of the rule of law, is without merit.” 
8 “Transition” usually refers to the particular form of economic and institutional change occurred in Eastern Europe after the collapse 
of the Communist regime. However, in some papers also China and other Asian countries are included. For a wider discussion on the 
concept of transition, see Colombatto (2001). 
9 For the aim of this paper (and also considering the remarkable differences), we decided not to concentrate our attention on the 
results of the different papers (with the only exception of those results that are similar for many researches). 
10 As for the above empirical researches, the use of data at country level (and, sometimes, considering groups of countries) is a shared 
characteristic, obviously explained by the lack of institutional data at sub-national levels. 
11 With the inclusion of China and other Asian countries. 
12 As for “reform index”, defined as a measure of the extent of reforms and a measure of institutional change, they use the average of 
the EBRD indices of liberalisation, financial reform, market reform and privatisation. 
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index derived from factor analysis14. They also highlighted the strong correlations among many 
reform measures15 and find an exception in the “State capture index”.  
In the above literature a positive relationship between institutional change (and initial 
conditions) and economic performance is obtained. Falcetti et al. (2005) considered the importance 
of initial conditions16 for economic performance and showed both the effects of progress in market-
oriented reforms on growth and the existence of important feedbacks (from growth to reforms) by 
using simultaneous equation estimation. The feedback effect of growth to reforms has been 
recognised in some previous papers (e.g. Heybey and Murrell 1999); in particular, Wolf (1999) 
analysed the feedback of growth to structural reforms, while Berg et al. (1999) and Ghosh (1997) 
recognised the potential endogeneity of stabilisation. Generally, in more recent papers the influence 
of reforms on growth (or other performance variables) has become more controversial, with an 
increasing attention to: (i) the endogeneity of reforms, (ii) the multicollinearity among different 
measures of reform and (iii) the sensitivity of results to the exclusion of the early years of transition. 
In particular, the sensitivity of results to the choice of time period is discussed in Fidrmuc (2003) 
and Lysenko (2002). It is interesting the use of “transition time” rather than usual calendar time, 
taking into account that the transition process started at different times in different countries 
(Falcetti et al. 2002 and 2005). The empirical papers belonging to this first group generally 
considered the GDP growth as the performance variable to be explained. 
 In the second group, the seminal paper of Aghion and Blanchard (1994) was followed by a 
huge literature focusing, theoretically and/or empirically, on the costs and benefits of the speed of 
transition and on the role of Government in favouring an optimal speed of transition (OST). The 
transition is described as a regime change from an allocation system based on central planning to 
one based on market forces. In particular, the optimal pace of worker and job reallocation was/is the 
source of great debate with an initial division between a “gradualist approach” (e.g. Dewatripont 
and Roland 1995) and the proponents of rapid “big bang” reform (e.g. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 
1992). Roland (2000) distinguished the following three main positions in the literature: (i) a first 
group of supporters of the “shock therapy” suggested a fast and comprehensive reform process in 
order to avoid the risk of “gradualism”, mainly in terms of probable individual measures 
ineffectiveness and consequent public opposition (e.g. Lipton and Sachs 1990; Aslund 2001; Sachs 
1992; Balcerowicz 1994; Berg 1994); (ii) a second group of authors suggested “gradualism” (and 
attention to national differences in sequencing) in order to minimise the social costs of transition, 
especially avoiding that too rapid reforms produced permanently high levels of unemployment 
(Svejnar 1991; Portes 1990; Roland 1991; Aghion and Blanchard 1994; Dewatripont and Roland 
1995; Murrell 1996); (iii) a third group highlighted the need for rapid change along some 
dimensions and for gradualism along others (e.g. Kornai 1992). Boeri (1999) analysed the role 
played by the relatively high level of non-employment benefits offered during the first years of 
transition in favouring a (too) speed17 reduction of employment in the state sector with a consequent 
high level of “stagnant” unemployment in most countries. Popov (2006) reconsidered the debate 
between “shock therapy” and “gradualism” producing an empirical investigation of 15 years of 
reforms, distinguishing the first years of transformational recession from the following period of 
economic growth. Many other papers analysed some effects of the speed of transition (Chandha and 
Coricelli 1994; Castanheira and Roland 2000; Kolodko 2004; Perugini and Signorelli 2004; Bruno 
                                                                                                                                                                  
13 The “State capture index” is taken from Hellman et al. (2000) and it measures the extent to which businesses have been affected by 
the sale of government decisions and policies to private interests. It is based on the business environment and enterprise performance 
survey implemented in 1999 by the EBRD in collaboration with the World Bank. 
14 This “initial condition index” (EBRD Transition report, 1999) represents a weighted average of measures for the level of 
development, trade dependence on CMEA, macroeconomic disequilibria, distance to the EU, natural resources endowments, market 
memory and state capacity. 
15 Once a country is reforming, it typically advances in many fronts. Obvious econometric difficulties in assessing the impact of each 
measure on economic performance arise. 
16 They found that the impact of initial condition on growth was declining over time, but it was still persistent in recent years 
suggesting the existence of indirect effects (possibly) through their impact on reforms. 
17 Compared to the number of job created in the new private sector. 
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2006). The theoretical and empirical papers belonging to this second group generally considered, 
with few exceptions, the unemployment rate change (and persistence) as the performance variable 
to be explained. 
 In the third group we briefly present authors that tried to define and empirically use a wider 
definition of institutions and institutional change18. Raiser (1997 and 1999) discussed the 
relationship between formal and informal institutions; he highlighted that any process of rapid 
formal institutional change, such as in transition economies, must contend with the legacy of an 
inherited set of informal institutions that may or may not be efficient under a changing economic 
and social environment and, in addition, he compared “top-down” versus “bottom up” institutional 
reforms by also considering the role of social capital and trust in transition. Hare (2001) considered 
the role of some key institutions (such as private property and business contracts, banking and 
financial regulation, labour market institutions, clear fiscal environment for firms, institutions 
dealing with competition/industrial/trade policies and, finally, trust between economic agents and 
trust and honesty in public institutions) and highlighted the importance of “missing institutions” in 
the early stage of transition. Schneider and Enste (2000) stressed the remarkable impact of the 
shadow economy on official institutions, norms and rules, and they proposed the shadow economy 
(around 20% in CEECs in 1999) as an indicator of the deficit of legitimacy of the present social 
order and the existing rules of official economic activities. Raiser et al. (2001) treated institutional 
change as a multidimensional unobserved variable and examined the determinants of institutional 
change (initial conditions and path dependence, changes in the structure of market demand, 
interaction with outside world and the capacity of the State for the implementation and enforcement 
of new rules) using a panel dataset for 25 transition economies. Nuti (2004) highlighted the 
complexity of the “great transformation”, the role of institutional vacuum (still persisting in some 
countries), the huge national differences in the paths of institutional transition and the possibility of 
distinguishing three groups of transition economies19. Roland (2001) considered some stylized facts 
of the transition process in Central and Eastern European Countries and China and proposed an 
“evolutionary-institutionalist” interpretation founded on: (i) the institutional perspective, (ii) the 
evolutionary approach (e.g. Murrell 1992), (iii) the great importance of economists’ relative 
ignorance of economic and social systems and their transformations and (iv) the emphasis on the 
high uncertainty associated to societal engineering20 (aversion toward large-scale institutional 
transformation). The theoretical and empirical papers belonging to this third group are much more 
heterogeneous with respect to the first two groups and, in some cases, they assessed a sort of 
“dynamic systemic performance”21.  
 
2.2. Regional features of labour market dynamics and economic growth 
 The theoretical and, especially, empirical (cross countries) literature on the regional (sub-
national) features of transition processes significantly increased in recent years22. The recent EU 
enlargements23 with the membership of ten formerly planned economies further contributed to the 
attractiveness of the sub-national levels of investigation (e.g. Caroleo and Pastore 2007). In 
empirical (comparative) regional researches the NUTS 2 level is usually considered, while the 
NUTS 3 level is rarely analysed. 
 In this section we briefly review a part of the theoretical and empirical literature highlighting 
some key regional features in transition economies, by distinguishing two groups of papers focusing 
                                                 
18 Some authors try to distinguish much more clearly between “reform progresses” and “institutional change”. 
19 The more advanced group is composed by the eight countries that became EU members in 2004. 
20 See also Dallago (1997). 
21 Implicitly rejecting the adoption of a single (simple) performance variable to be explained. 
22 Regional (sub-national levels) studies have a very long tradition in theoretical and empirical economics. As for the empirical 
researches, the increasing availability of comparable international data permitted to shift the focus from the initially prevailing 
analyses of a single country to cross countries and panel investigations. 
23 As well known, eight countries became EU members in May 2004 (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia) and two more countries in January 2007 (Romania and Bulgaria). 
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on: (i) the explanations of labour market performance differences and dynamics and (ii) the 
investigations of economic and structural convergence. 
 
2.2.1. Regional labour market dynamics in transition economies 
 First of all, it is useful:  
i. to recall the situation of chronic labour shortage typical of planned economies (Kornai, 1980 
and 1992), especially the more developed and industrialised (CEECs),  
ii. to highlight that the new unemployment phenomenon emerged in early stage of transition 
was largely unexpected in its main characters (two digits levels and wide regional 
differences); moreover, it was wrongly considered of short duration by the initial 
(optimistic) theoretical models of transition (e.g. Aghion and Blanchard 1994)24. 
As for the explanation of regional labour market performance differences, some authors 
highlighted the importance of the regional differences in initial conditions. Scarpetta (1995) showed 
that transition particularly affected the regions in which the planned economy had concentrated the 
largest part of economic activities (especially in the manufacturing sector), while Gorzelak (1996) 
stressed the importance of the regional distance from the core of Europe. Other authors focused on 
the role of the degree of restructuring affected by the depth and speed of the reform process: Newell 
and Pastore (2000) showed that when unemployment is positively related to workers’ reallocation 
across regions, spatial unemployment differentials increase and the main reason is a different degree 
of industrial change.  
In order to explain regional unemployment, Boeri (2000) especially focused on the 
immobility of workers (caused by lack of housing in potential destination area) and the existence of 
wage rigidities. A survey on the “mystery” of regional labour market performance differentials can 
be found in Elhorst (2003), while Ferragina and Pastore (2006) presented a complete review of the 
theoretical literature focusing on regional unemployment and OST and, especially, they compare 
the Aghion-Blanchard model (based on the role of demand side factors) and the Boeri model 
(centred on the importance of supply side factors).  
With reference to the empirical literature, Scarpetta and Huber (1995) developed a 
taxonomy of the candidate countries’ regional development and highlighted the better performance 
of capital cities and border regions (see also Brulhart and Koeinig, 2006), mainly due to better 
initial conditions, market accessibility and ability to attract FDI. Some authors attempted to identify 
the mechanisms of regional labour market adjustment in transition (e.g. Bornhorst and Commander, 
2006; Huber, 2004; Gacs and Huber, 2005), while Fidrmuc (2004) highlighted the scarce role of 
migration in reducing regional disparities in the CEECs. Concerning the regional labour market 
developments in transition, Huber (2007) presented a complete survey of the empirical literature. 
 
2.2.2. Economic and structural convergence of regions in Europe and in the transition 
countries 
It is well known that, in Europe as a whole, interregional disparities in per capita income or 
productivity are large and persisting. For instance, they are wider in the EU than in the USA. Over 
time, they decreased from the ‘50s to the mid-‘70s of the last century, but they did so quite slowly: 
2% was the annual reduction in the β-convergence estimations. This is an unsatisfactory pace, given 
the goal of economic and social cohesion set by the EU’s institutions, so that regional convergence 
is an explicit objective of the EU.25  
More recently, in the last three decades, the trends have become even more unclear, with 
convergence limited to certain sub-groups of countries (club convergence) and specific time 
                                                 
24 Some authors focused on the role played by high non-employment benefits (at the outset of transition) in increasing both the 
reservation wage and the unemployment or the inactive (e.g. Rutkowski and Przybila, 2002).   
25 The final goal of EU includes, among others, also the economic and social cohesion, both between the member states (as the 
mention of solidarity in the EU Treaty indicates) and within themselves. This goal should be achieved through the common market, 
the economic and monetary union, and more specific instruments, such as the regional policy and structural funds. 
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intervals, and, in any case, still weaker.26 Interregional disparities seem to be substantial with 
reference to other economic variables as well, such as the unemployment rate or the employment 
growth rates (see Boldrin and Canova, 2001, among others).  
Notice that, according to some theoretical hypothesis, e.g. by Williamson (1965), if we 
consider the long-run evolution of regional disparities in individual countries, they normally 
increase in the early stages of development and then start to decrease, thus confirming an inverted-
U relationship between the regional dispersion in per capita incomes and the level of development. 
Two possible “dilemmas” now arise: (i) whether we are more interested in “regional 
convergence” in production rather than “regional cohesion” in terms of income, consumption or 
welfare (the two concepts may differ because of public transfers); (ii) whether disparities between 
countries are more relevant than disparities within countries. In fact, in order to strengthen the 
catching-up process at the country level, a rise27 in regional inequalities within individual countries 
may be a necessary by-product of the growth process, i.e. regional concentration of production may 
lead to efficiency gains. This evolution, that seems predominant in recent European trends, raises 
some key questions also to the European regional policy (Martin, 2006). 
Real convergence28 can be evaluated in terms of the similarity of final outcomes for real 
economic variables: production, income, employment, etc.; for instance, differences in levels of 
development, competitiveness, labour market performance may reveal the degree of real 
convergence. Not to mention here the more far-reaching, economic and political, criteria (specified 
by the EU Commission in more than 30 chapters) that the new member states had to satisfy before 
joining the EU. 
Convergence in outcomes is more likely if the economics structures are more similar; as a 
matter of fact29: (a) in the long run, the narrowing of  differences in the structural conditions of 
different countries or regions allows the achievement of similar steady states and development 
levels (as maintained by the “conditional convergence” hypothesis in the economic growth 
literature); (b) in the short run, more homogeneous economic structures make the economic shocks 
more symmetric, thus producing similar reactions of real variables to the shocks. 
Considering for the moment the issue of convergence between countries and focusing on the 
degree of synchronicity, Frankel and Rose (1998) analyze the positive effects of growing foreign 
trade on synchronicity, proposing the well-known argument of the endogeneity of “optimum 
currency area” (OCA)’s criteria: even if the latter are not satisfied ex-ante, they come to be 
validated (endogenously) ex-post when a group of countries decide to create a monetary union. The 
endogeneity argument has been extended, in later studies, from trade deepening to institutional 
convergence, flexibility of product and labour markets, equalization of prices, fiscal integration, 
financial convergence. However, Imbs (1999) underplay the impact of trade and rather emphasize 
the role of bilateral differences in sectoral structures (together with differences in GDP levels). 
Synchronicity has augmented not only within the Eurozone or the EU15 group of countries, 
but also between “old” and “new” Europe. In particular, the new member states had in recent years 
a robust pace of nominal convergence (although with some unbalances in the deficit/GDP ratios), 
growing trade openness (trade deepening of new members developed even before the official EU 
accession), trade integration with EU15, significant reforms in labour markets and in institutions, 
and finally increasing business cycle synchronicity with the euro area.30  
                                                 
26 Since 1995, in eight countries of EU15 internal regional disparities have increased, while inequalities among countries diminished 
(Martin, 2006). 
27 Many aspects of the increase in regional “within countries” inequality are still partly unclear (both theoretically and empirically): 
(i) is it a “temporary” phenomenon? (ii) how long is “temporary”? (iii) is it possible to detect an U-inverted shape phenomenon? (iv) 
are there hysteresis and persistence characters? 
28 To be distinguished from nominal convergence, e.g. concerning the compliance with the Maastricht criteria (related to inflation 
rate, interest rate, exchange rate, public sector debt and deficit), which are relevant for the admission of new member states to the 
euro club (as did Slovenia in January 2007).  
29 For a concise summary of the two views, see Marelli (2006); many arguments in this sub-section draw from this paper. 
30 However, the record is more mixed as regards real convergence (growth, productivity, etc.), output specialisation, delays in the 
modernisation of the financial systems (Angeloni et al., 2005).  
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More explicitly, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia exhibit the highest correlations with the euro 
area, comparable to those of some “core” EU15 countries and higher than those of the peripheral 
countries (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, and Finland); the lowest correlations, close to zero, are 
found in the Baltic states (Darvas and Szapáry, 2005; Fidrmuc and Korhonen, 2006).31  
Coming now to the regional business cycles, many authors in the past, e.g. Fatàs (1997), 
discovered that a rising correlation of national cycles in Europe has been accompanied by declining 
co-movements across regions. However, regional growth is more synchronised when regions look 
alike in the sectoral structure, where the latter can be analysed by using some synthetic “indicators 
of similarity” (see Belke and Heine, 2004). Regions are not only more open, but also more 
specialised than national economic systems; the probability that sector-specific shocks may 
generate asymmetric responses is consequently much higher at the regional level (see e.g. De 
Nardis et al., 1996).32
As to the empirical studies, the convergence or divergence outcomes in regional economic 
structures depend not only on the individual countries considered, but also on the specific sectors 
(non-convergence is more likely in the industrial sector than in the services), on the level of sectoral 
disaggregation (manufacturing branches exhibit frequently heterogeneous behaviour), on the 
consideration of the economic structure in terms of trade rather than production (convergence in 
trade is more probable thanks to the growing importance of intra-industry trade).33
There many studies concerning the evolving specialisation of new member states (see e.g. 
Zaghini, 2005): these countries have been able to change rapidly their specialisation toward high-
tech products (including machinery and transport equipment), for which the world demand grows at 
fast rates. These countries can take advantage, among other things, of high skilled labour forces, 
huge FDI inflows, restructuring in production, and modernisation of the capital stock. 
In addition to sectoral structure, many other structural transformations and institutional 
reforms may affect the evolution of regional disparities. For example, the transition to a market 
economy in new member states has implied heavy restructuring processes, reallocation of labour 
between sectors (particularly from old sate-owned branches to new private activities), with an 
important “transitional” (or transformational) recession in the early stages of transition. Such 
structural changes had differentiated impacts across the various countries and regions (Boeri and 
Terrel, 2002). 
 
3. Initial conditions, institutional changes and aggregate performance: some stylized facts 
 As also highlighted by Kornai (2006), the economic structure and its transformation is 
different in the various countries; nevertheless, there are common elements, and we can only truly 
understand the unique properties of each country if we compare it with other countries. 
 In this section we present (and briefly discuss) some up date (1989-2006) stylized facts for 
the 8-CEECs new EU members in 2004, by distinguishing: (i) initial conditions, (ii) institutional 
change and reform policies and (iii) economic performance (GDP growth, unemployment and 
employment rates, etc.)34.  
 Before doing that, some well known population differences and geographical characteristics 
are presented (Table A1 in Appendix). Poland (38 millions, stable in the period 1990-2006) has 
more than half of the total population of the area; Hungary and Czech Republic have a similar 
population (10 millions, partly declining in the period 1990-2006, especially in Hungary); Slovak 
republic accounts about half of the population (5 millions) of the latter countries. The small total 
population of Slovenia and the three Baltic countries declined in the period 1990-2006, with the 
exception of Slovenia. 
                                                 
31 More specific studies, by distinguishing between supply and demand shocks, demonstrate that the latter have converged, thanks to 
the endogeneity processes, while asymmetries have prevailed in supply shocks (Babetskii, 2005). 
32 Many economists are willing to concede that Krugman's hypothesis of a growing sectoral specialisation is more realistic at the 
regional level than at the national one. 
33 See Böwer and Guillemineau (2006), Giannone and Reichlin (2006), Marelli (2004). 
34 It is possible to find a literature on the "stylised facts" of transition (e.g. Campos and Coricelli, 2002). 
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3.1. Initial economic and institutional conditions 
 We selected some of the many possible quantitative variables able to highlight the "initial"35 
national differences in economic and institutional conditions (Table 1). The years under central 
planning, generally considered as a proxy of "market memory", range from 5 decades (the three 
Baltic countries) to 4 decades (the four bigger countries), with Slovenia in an intermediate 
situation36. As well known, the histories and State formation in the eight countries were 
significantly different and they can be summarised with some difficulty by simple (categorical) 
variables. Poland presented the lowest initial per capita GNP and an initial higher share of private 
sector (30%) compared to other countries. Slovenia showed the highest level of economic 
development (expressed in per capita GNP in 1989), followed by Czech Region. The phenomenon 
of repressed inflation (1987-90) was remarkable in the Baltic countries and significant in Poland 
and Slovenia. 
 
Table 1 - Initial conditions (a): some institutional and development "distortions" 
 
Years under 
central planning1
(and first year of 
transition2) 
 
State3
Private sector  
% share in 
GDP 
1989 
per capita  
GNP at PPPP4  
(US $ 1989) 
Public 
expenditure in 
% of GDP 
1989 
Repressed  
inflation5
1987-90 
PL 41 (1990) 2 30 4,718 48.8 13.6 
HU 42 (1990) 2 5 6,155 61.5 -7.7 
CZ 42 (1991) 1 5 8,460 64.5 -7.1 
SK 42 (1991) 0 5 6,680 64.5 -7.1 
EE 51 (1992) 0 10 5,237 31.8 25.7 
LV 51 (1992) 0 10 5,105 31.0 25.7 
LT 51 (1992) 0 10 5,523 53.8 25.7 
SI 46 (1990) 1 10 9,384 41.1 12.0 
Source: EBRD and The World Bank, Syrquin and Chenery (1989), Tarr (1993). 
1 As calculated in De Melo et al. (1997). 
2 Transition year is defined as the year in which central planning was dismantled (Fisher and Sahay, 2004). 
3 State is an indicator variable which takes the value 2 for independent states prior to 1989, 1 for decentralised 
states and 0 for new nations. 
4 Data on per capita GNP at PPP reflect the most recent EBRD estimates. 
5 Repressed inflation is calculated as percent change in real wage less the percent change in real GDP over 
1987-90. 
  The data for Czech Republic and Slovak Republic are referred to the two regions that formally became 
separated countries in 1993. 
  
 The overindustrialisation phenomenon37 is confirmed in Table 2, especially for the two 
regions of the former Czechoslovakia. Poland presented one of the highest contributions of industry 
to GDP formation in 1990 together with the lowest employment in industry sector and the highest 
agricultural employment38. The urbanisation index was high in the Baltic republics. Initial 
distortions in trade flows can be captured by the share of export towards CMEA countries 
(extremely high in the Baltic republics, remarkable in Poland and very low in Slovenia39) and by an 
indicator of "black market exchange rate premium" (particularly high in the Baltic republics and 
quite low in Slovenia). 
 
                                                 
35 The initial conditions are generally related to 1989 or 1990. 
36 As well known, Slovenia experimented the particular "institutional framework and evolution" realised in the former 
Yugoslavia. 
37 Generally the planned economies were characterised by a higher share of industrial sector, compared to market economies of 
similar development level. 
38 This is also related to the highest share of private sector on total GNP. 
39 Obviously, this significantly depends also on geographical reasons. 
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Table 2 - Initial conditions (b): sectoral employment, urbanisation and exports 
 
Employment (GDP 
curr. prices and 
predicted1) 
% share in Industry 
1990 
Employment 
% share in 
Agriculture 
1990 
Urbanization 
(% of pop.)  
1990 
Total Exports  
in % of GDP 
and CMEA Exp.2
1990 
Black market  
exchange rate  
% premium3
1990 
PL 31.5 (52; 39) 24.8 61.4 33 (50) 277 
HU 32.0 (36; 37) 12.8 61.5 28 (35) 46.7 
CZ 41.9 (58; 37) 7.6 64.8 24 (41) 185 
SK 42.3 (59; 36) 12.6 56.0 24 (41) 185 
EE 37.4 (44; 34) 19.9 71.6 29 (94) 1828 
LV 36.7 (45; 35) 17.9 70.9 33 (96) 1828 
LT 42.0 (45; 35) 19.2 68.0 37 (91) 1828 
SI 41.8 (44; 39) 14.3 50.3 24 (19) 27 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics (only for sectoral employment), EBRD and The World Bank, History of 
Planned Economies, World Development Report (various issues).  
1 The predicted share of industry is derived using the regression results in Syrquin and Chenery (1986). 
2 Percentage shares of export with CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) countries are presented 
in parenthesis. 
3 The black market exchange rate premium is an indicator of expectations and foreign exchange rationing.   
 
 Finally, as for the countries considered in this paper, we present in Table 3 the initial  
condition synthetic indexes (calculated in EBRD Transition report 1999), used in many empirical 
papers (e.g. Hare, 2001 and Fisher-Sahay, 2004)40. Better initial conditions were detected in Czech 
region, Hungary, Slovenia and Slovak region, with Polonia in an intermediate position, while the 
Baltic countries largely resulted with the worst initial conditions41. 
 
Table 3 - Initial condition synthetic indexes (1989) 
PL 1.9 
HU 3.3 
CZ 3.5 
SK 2.9 
EE -0.4 
LV -0.2 
LT 0.0 
SI 3.2 
Source: EBRD Transition report (1999).  
Note: These indexes are derived from factor analysis and represent a weighted average of measures for the level of 
development, trade dependence on CMEA, macroeconomic disequilibria, distance to the EU, natural resources 
endowments, market memory and state capacity. The higher values of the index relate to more favourable 
starting positions. 
   
 
3.2. Institutional change and reform policies 
 As shown in many papers reviewed in Section 2.1, institutional change is a very complex 
phenomenon that in transition countries occurred at a very rapid speed. In this Section we briefly 
                                                 
40 Other indexes (like the FDI restriction index presented in Appendix) are calculated for specific periods only. 
41 These synthetic indexes have been calculated by considering the 25 transition countries all together and, therefore, 
they do not necessarily reflect a precise ranking for the initial conditions in the group of the 8-CEECs. 
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present the available quantitative indicators42 that can be used as proxy of institutional change and 
policy reforms in the eight CEECs (graphically distinguished in "four big" and "four small").  
 
Graph 1 - Private sector % share in GDP
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Source: EBRD data 
 
 
Graph 2 - Private sector % share in GDP
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Source: EBRD data 
 
 A common distinction is between initial-phase reforms, such as price and trade liberalisation 
and small-scale privatisation, and second-phase reforms which address deeper institutional reforms 
such as corporate governance, competition policy and reform of financial institutions. In addition, 
the 8 CEECs became EU members in May 2004 and in the previous years they had also to 
accomplish the objective of reaching the "acquis communautaire". 
                                                 
42 Other researches devote more attention to the "quality" of institutions and factors affecting the business environment (e.g. 
Havrylyshyn and van Rooden 2003). 
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 A first important stylized fact is that, in a very short period, the share of private sector in 
GDP, from an initial level lower than 10% (with the exception of Poland), remarkably increased up 
to 70-80%. Poland started with the highest share of private sector on GDP in 1989 (30%), it was 
reached in 1993-4 by the other three larger countries and it continued its lower "speed of 
privatisation" also in the second half of 1990s43.   
 Every year the EBRD Transition report provides numerical scores for a set of nine reform 
indicators (the score ranges from 1, which represents little or no change from a planned economy, to 
4+, which represents the standard of an advanced market economy). The nine EBRD transition 
indicators are highly correlated over time as shown by the Polish case (Table A2 in Appendix).  As a 
first step and as highlighted in some econometric researches (e.g. Raiser et al. 2001), the use of 
simple averages of some selected transition indicators "may not be a bad approximation of 
institutional change". We present the simple mean of the nine EBRD transition index in Graph 3 
and 4. For example, Czech Region (that became an independent state in 1993) showed a rapid 
transition between 1990 and 1994, while Slovenia started from better initial conditions and 
exhibited a rather gradual transition in subsequent years. It should be noted that the largest part of 
transition progress occurred within a decade and, especially, in the first 5-6 years of transition.  
 
Graph 3 - Synthetic index (1-9)
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Source: EBRD data 
Note: The synthetic index is the simple mean of the following nine EBRD indexes: (i) large scale privatisation, 
(ii) small scale privatisation, (iii) enterprise restructuring, (iv) price liberalisation, (v) trade and foreign 
exchange system, (vi) competition policy, (vii) banking reform and interest rate liberalisation, (viii) securities 
markets and non-bank financial institutions, (ix) overall infrastructure reform. 
 
                                                 
43 The available data on employment in private sector are presented in the Appendix. 
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Graph 4 - Synthetic index (1-9)
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Source: EBRD data 
Note: The synthetic index is the simple mean of the following nine EBRD index: (i) large scale privatisation, 
(ii) small scale privatisation, (iii) enterprise restructuring, (iv) price liberalisation, (v) trade and foreign 
exchange system, (vi) competition policy, (vii) banking reform and interest rate liberalisation, (viii) securities 
markets and non-bank financial institutions, (ix) overall infrastructure reform. 
 
 
3.3. Aggregate performance 
 In this section we present the main stylized facts at the national level, regarding (i) the 
intensity and duration of the "transitional recession", (ii) the economic performance measured in 
terms of per capita GDP, unemployment and employment rates, net job creation/destruction and 
inflation rate for the whole period 1989-2006 and (iii) the sigma convergence/divergence dynamics 
of per capita GDP and the rates of unemployment, employment and inflation. 
 
   Table 4 - Duration and intensity of the "transitional recession" 
 First Transition year 
(T) 
Lowest Output year 
(TM) 
Total Output decline 
(from T-1 to TM) 
CZECH REPUBLIC* (1948) 1991 1992 -12.1 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC* (1948) 1991 1993 -24.4 
POLAND (1948) 1990 1991 -13.7 
HUNGARY (1948) 1990 1993 -18.1 
Slovenia (1945) 1990 1992 -20.4 
Estonia (1940) 1992 1994 -29.4 
Latvia (1940) 1992 1993 -44.2 
Lithuania (1940) 1992 1994 -40.6 
Source: World Bank 
Legend: T = the year in which central planning was dismantled. TM = the year in which the output was lowest. 
* = We use the data of the two regions which became independent in 1993.  
In parenthesis the first year of communism is indicated. 
 
 The "transitional recession" was particularly severe in Latvia (-44.2% between 1991 and 
1993) and Lithuania (-40.6% between 1991 and 1994), but also in Estonia (-29.4% between 1991 
and 1994), Slovak Region (-24.4% between 1990 and 1993), Slovenia (-20.4% between 1989 and 
1992) and Hungary (-18.1% between 1989 and 1993). The output decline was lower in Poland (-
13.7% between 1989 and 1991) and Czech Region (-12.1% between 1990 and 1992). As already 
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noted, the "transitional recessions" have been (generally) much more severe than expected 
(especially, considering that in some countries the recession started before the "first year of 
transition" considered below). The duration of the recession range from two years (Poland) to five 
years (Estonia and Lithuania). 
 The official figures of GDP and its growth are also related to the extent of the shadow 
economy44. The existing estimation (1999) highlighted significant differences (from the relatively 
low levels of Slovak and Czech republics to the extremely high level in Latvia). 
 
Table 5 - The size (% of GDP) of the shadow economy in CEE countries in 1999 
PL HU CH SK ES LT LV SI 
27.6 25.1 19.1 18.9 n.a. 30.3 39.9 27.1 
Source: Schneider (2003), calculations based on World Bank data (2002) 
 
 The transitional recession has been followed by a gradual recovery of the initial per capita 
GDP and then by a significant development (Graph 5 and 6), with growth rates generally higher 
than those of the old EU members. 
 
Graph 5 - annual GDP growth rates 1989-2006
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Graph 6 - annual GDP growth rates 1989-2006
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Source: EBRD data 
                                                 
44 Obviously, the difficulties in the estimation of the size of the shadow economy and its partial (and heterogeneous) 
incorporation in the official GDP figures, partly reduces the comparability of the data on GDP levels and changes. 
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 The unemployment rates45 exhibited complex national evolutions and differences between 
countries. In particular, Poland experimented the worst performance with a huge increase in the 
period 1990-93 (up to 16.4%) followed by a partial decline in 1994-97 (10.3% in 1997), a new 
increase in 1998-2002 (up to 20%) and a reduction in recent years (17.6% in 2005). Slovak 
Republic showed a similar (negative) unemployment dynamics (up to 19.2% in 1999), with a slow 
reduction in recent years (15.3% in 2005). In Hungary the initial significant increase (up to 11.9% 
in 1993) was followed by a reduction in 1994-2001 (5.7% in 2001) and a moderate increase in 
recent years (up to 7.3% in 2005). Czech Republic displayed the best performance, with an 
unemployment rate lower than 5% in the period 1990-1997 followed by a partial increase and a 
stabilization near 7.5% in recent years. 
Graph 7 - Unemployment rates
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Source: EBRD data.  
 
 As for the four smaller economies (Graph 8), the unemployment rate rapidly increased in 
Latvia (more than 20% in 1996) with a following reduction below 10%. In Lithuania, the increase 
in mid 1990s (17% in 1995) was followed by a period of stability around 15% and a clear decline in 
recent years. The unemployment rate gradually increased in Estonia (up to 14% in 2000) with a 
reduction in recent years. In Slovenia the unemployment rate never went over 10% and remained 
quite stable around 7%. 
 
Graph 8 - Unemployment rates
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Source: EBRD data.  
                                                 
45 As highlighted by Kornai (2006): “Open unemployment was unknown in the socialist economy; the employment rate was very 
high, every worker could feel secure at his or her workplace. Indeed, an inverse disequilibrium prevailed. The socialist economy 
created chronic shortages, including a chronic labor shortage - at least, in the more developed and industrialised Central Eastern 
European countries. This has come to the end. The employment rate has significantly declined and open unemployment has 
appeared.” 
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 If we consider the three quantitative objectives of the European Employment Strategy46, 
some interesting national differences arise. If we compare the total employment rate47 (in recent 
years)48 for the four big countries, the best performance of Czech Republic (with a recent trend 
similar to EU-15) and the dramatic position of Poland (with a distance of more than 15 points from 
European objective), are largely confirmed. On the contrary, the labour market performance of 
Slovak Republic and Hungary appear much less positive with respect to the unemployment rate 
indicator. The four smaller economies experimented employment rates generally higher than 60%, 
with significant progress towards the European objective in recent year49. 
  
Graph 9 - Total Employment rates
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Graph 10 - Total Employment rates
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Source: Eurostat data  
 
 The beginning of the transition was generally characterised by immediate price 
liberalisation50 and, as an obvious consequence, all the countries experimented significant increases 
in the inflation rates, but with remarkable differences. In the three Baltic countries the extremely 
high price dynamics in 1992 (around 1,000%) and 1993 (especially Lithuania at a value higher than 
                                                 
46 In the Lisbon European Council (2000) the following two objectives have been defined: (i) a total employment rate at 70% 
(calculated on working age population 15-64) and (ii) a female employment rate higher than 60%. Besides, at the Stockholm 
European Council (2001) the following objective for “older workers” has been defined: an employment rate higher than 50% for the 
population between 55 and 64 years. All the three objectives have to be reached by 2010.  
47 The data for the other two European objectives are presented in the Appendix. 
48 The comparable (Eurostat) data are available only since 1996-98. 
49 The labour market performance can be measured by using other variables, like net job creation/destruction (see the 
Appendix). 
50 The evolution of the EBRD indexes of price liberalisation are presented in the Appendix. 
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400%) were followed by clear declines in the following years (Table 6)51. Poland showed a very 
high and increasing inflation rate in 1989 (251%) and 1990 (585%), with quite fast declines in the 
following years. In Slovenia, the inflation rates were high in 1991 (115%) and especially 1992 
(207%), but rapidly declined. The remaining three countries experimented lower and much more 
stable price dynamics. 
 
Table 6 - Inflation rates in the first years of transition (1989-1995) 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Estonia n.a. n.a n.a 1,076.0 89.8 47.7 29.0 
Latvia  n.a n.a n.a 951.2 109.2 35.9 25.0 
Lithuania n.a n.a n.a 1,020.5 410.4 72.1 39.6 
Slovenia  n.a n.a 115.0 207.3 32.9 21.0 13.5 
Poland  251.1 585.8 70.3 43.0 35.3 32.2 27.8 
Hungary 17.0 28.9 35.0 23.0 22.5 18.8 28.2 
Czech Republic 1.4 9.7 52.0 11.1 20.8 9.9 9.6 
Slovak Republic 2.3 10.8 61.2 10.0 23.2 13.4 9.9 
 Source: EBRD data 
 
 If we compare the relative growth of the eight countries, it is interesting to note that a 
general “sigma convergence” of national per capita GDP can be detected, with a stronger tendency 
for the four smaller countries.  
 Considering the unemployment rates, a sigma convergence for the period 1993-98 was 
followed by a moderate divergence (1998-2002) and a new slow convergence (2002-05). The above 
dynamics is the result of a significant sigma convergence between the four smaller countries 
(excluding the year 1993) and a substantial persistence of the disparities in the four big countries.52  
 By using the national total employment rates, any significant sigma convergence dynamic 
emerged, but the coefficient of variation resulted extremely low for the four smaller economies53.  
 Finally, as to the inflation rates, the sigma convergence dynamics (and price stabilisation) of 
the first years of transition  was followed by a dominant persistence in national disparities. 
 
Graph 11 - Disparities in national per capita GDP 
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Source: our elaboration on EBRD database.  
Note: 4-big = Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovak Republic; 4-small = Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Slovenia. The coefficient of variation is calculated on per capita GDP (in US Dollar). 
 
                                                 
51 Concerning the inflation rates in the period 1995-2006, see the Appendix. 
52 As highlighted in the Appendix, the sigma convergence for the inflation rate showed an unstable tendency, with a prevailing 
reduction of disparities in the first period and an unstable persistence in the more recent period. 
53 As for the sigma convergence on the other two European indicators, see the Appendix. 
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Graph 12 - Disparities in national unemployment rates 
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Source: our elaboration on EBRD database.  
Note: 4-big = Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovak Republic; 4-small = Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Slovenia. 
Graph 13 - Disparities in national total employment rates 
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Source: our elaboration on Source: Eurostat data  
Note: 4-big = Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovak Republic; 4-small = Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Slovenia. 
Graph 14 - Disparities in inflation rates 
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Source: our elaboration on EBRD data  
Note: 4-big = Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovak Republic; 4-small = Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Slovenia. 
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4. Regional features of transition countries: some empirical results 
 
The eight transition countries, that have joined the EU in 2004, have shown in the period 
1990-2006 a clear catching-up process, as confirmed by the growth of the index of per capita 
income toward the European (EU-25) average (Graphs A21 and A22 in the Appendix).54 This can 
be appreciated both in large and in small countries of Eastern Europe. Apart from an initial period, 
corresponding to the “transitional recession” (see Section 3), we can notice a growing trend in all 
countries.     
But now a possible question arises, which is the specific topic of this section. Was the 
growth and catching-up process a generalised phenomenon, common not only to all the eight 
countries, but also to all regions within those countries? The answer is clearly negative, since the 
growth process has been extremely heterogeneous. Just consider the dispersion in per capita 
incomes of all (120) regions of the EU-8 group of countries. We refer to the NUTS-3 regions, a 
territorial disaggregation that is rather uncommon in research papers.55
Relative to the European average, income disparities have increased in all regions of large 
countries; in the small ones, they start to decrease in the recent years thanks to the catching-up at 
the country level (Graph 15). Considering now disparities within countries (Graphs 16 and 17), all 
of them, both large and small, exhibit a growing dispersion (only in Slovenia disparities have been 
more or less steady). 
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Source: our elaborations on Cambridge Econometrics data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54 The data are taken from Cambridge Econometrics’ European regional databank, which is based on the Eurostat series. 
55 As an exception, see Aumayr (2007). For certain analysis, it is not possible to consider alternative solutions, also because for the 
four smallest countries there is no regional breakdown in NUTS-2 regions. 
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Graph 16 
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Source: our elaborations on Cambridge Econometrics data 
 
 
Graph 17 
Disparities in income per capita - NUTS3 regions
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Source: our elaborations on Cambridge Econometrics data 
 
By comparing Graph 11 of the previous section, exhibiting a sigma-convergence at the 
national level and the two latter graphs, displaying on the contrary a clear divergence at the 
regional level, a trade-off between fast growth of countries and the internal income distribution 
unambiguously emerges. This trade-off is more likely in the early stages of development, such as 
the transition period of the new members, coherently with the assumptions of the Williamson’s law 
(1965). 
A cross-section snap-shot of the beta-convergence, or rather – in our case – divergence, is 
offered by the Graph 18, concerning the situation in 2006: incomes disparities are highest in low-
income countries. 
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Graph 18 
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Source: our elaborations on Cambridge Econometrics data 
 
A time-series view of the beta-convergence is instead presented by Graph 19, from which 
we can see that the rate of growth has been higher in regions with an initial56 low level of per-capita 
income. But, again, this is the outcome of the convergence process between countries (see the 
clustering of the regions of each country in specific areas of the graph); within countries the 
situation is much less clear.  
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Source: our elaborations on Cambridge Econometrics data 
 
The divergence trends of regional per-capita income within countries are evident from  
Graph 20, where it is shown, with reference to the most recent period (2000-06), that in general 
disparities increase more in fast-growing countries. 
 
                                                 
56 The average income for the period 1990-95 has been considered, in order to exclude unusual values of per capita GDP for certain 
regions. 
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Graph 20 
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he mentioned trade-off may arise because of spatial polarisation processes, such as those 
investig
ng obvious 
compar
 extent of concentration of production in the eight transition countries, 
we can
tion is to consider how production is clustering toward 
the lea
                                                
ta
T
ated in the new economic geography and focusing on the links between trade integration, 
economies of scale and concentration of production (see e.g. Krugman, 1993). The theoretical 
models have been further developed by considering spatial accessibility and trade costs. 
Thus, as recently explained by Martin (2006), certain regions, although lacki
ative advantages, can become centres of production thanks to the interaction between the 
working of economies of scale and trade costs: economies of scale, together with easier access to 
markets, may compensate for higher production costs. This is the case of the leading regions in 
transition countries.57 Similar polarization effects can be found also in terms of unemployment 
(Overman and Puga, 2002). 
To get an idea of the
 compute an index of spatial concentration (à la Gini) of total value added: this variable is 
better than employment since it takes account of possible differences in productivity due to 
concentration of production, internal and external economies of scale, etc. Such an index of 
dissimilarity58 reveals an increasing concentration in all countries (see Graphs A23 and A24 in the 
Appendix); Slovenia is the only exception. 
A more direct measure of concentra
ding areas of each country, i.e. around the capital cities. Table A.4 in the Appendix shows 
the concentration of Total Value Added (as well as of value added of the three main sectors: 
agriculture, industry, and the services), in comparison with concentration of Population, for three 
years: 1990, 2000, 2006. First of all, it is interesting that population has not clustered toward capital 
cities (differently from the trends in many developing countries): in Budapest and in Riga the share 
 
57 Martin (2006) illustrates a scenario of global convergence and local divergence, that may arise “if the international cost advantage 
of the poorer country is larger than the national cost advantage of the poorer region”; the cost of production is the main driving cost 
between countries (in fact wages and labour costs still differ widely between countries), while market access is the main driving force 
of location between regions. Moreover, the richest regions of poor countries benefit usually both from large domestic markets and 
good market access to other countries. 
58 It is the summation of vertical deviations between the Lorenz curve and the line of perfect equality (the closer the DIS is to 1, the 
more dissimilar the distribution is to the line of perfect equality): DIS = ½  Σr ⏐1/n – sr⏐; where 1/n (n is the number of regions) is the 
expected share of region r in case of perfect equality and sr  is the actual share of each region. 
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of national population has actually decreased; in other countries, no relevant changes can be 
detected. 
A clustering of service activities around capital cities was expected and can actually be 
observed from the data, ranging in the final year to more than 70% in Estonia and Latvia (of course 
the highest concentrations are normally found in smaller countries), to a bit less than 20% in 
Poland. More surprising is the concentration of industry’s value added: more than half of industrial 
output – in terms of value added – in Estonia and Latvia comes from capital cities’ regions, in all 
other cases, there has been an increase, at least till 2000 (then in some countries there has been a 
stationary situation or a slight fall). 
As a consequence, given the much more stable distribution of population, the spatial 
changes in economic activities have led both to huge increases in productivity in the “leading” areas 
of each country and to large improvements in (relative) per-capita incomes. This conjecture is 
confirmed by the data of Jasmand and Stiller (2005), who found higher productivity levels and 
widening gaps in the capitals (with the largest gap in Budapest, whose productivity is 80% greater 
than the national average); the authors emphasize too that many capital cities of transition countries 
already have a per capita income (measured in purchasing power parities) well above the EU15 
average. Moreover, unemployment rates are lower than in the rest of the countries. 
A possible explanation is that in the ‘90s capitals’ regions were more flexible in adjusting to 
transition, EU integration and changing economic structures, thanks to their greater diversification 
(in contrast with former mono-industrialised industrial regions, in particular those specialised on 
armament, mining, steel and textile industries, under central planning). Moreover, the clustering of 
activities around capital cities can also be explained by the interaction between industrial activities, 
the existence of advanced services, the availability of “superior” resources (human capital, know 
how, research centres, public services, FDI attraction pools, good infrastructure, etc.), and the 
accessibility to large (both domestic and foreign) markets.  
Besides the spatial concentration, another structural feature of regional economies is their 
productive specialisation. Previous research (Marelli, 2006) has shown that, at the NUTS-2 level, in 
Europe regional specialisation has decreased in the overall economy and in the services, while it has 
increased in the industrial sector; in the transition economies, the specialisation index is higher than 
in other European countries, but in most cases it is decreasing as well. A commonly used index is 
the specialization coefficient or Krugman’s specialization index: 
KSIr = ½ Σi ⏐si,r  – si,0⏐ 
where si,r is the share of sector i out of total employment in region r and si,0 is the corresponding 
share in the reference region (or country). 
 At the NUTS-3 level, structural convergence can be analyzed just for three sectors (i = 
agriculture, industry, services). In our case, the KSI index has been computed on the basis of 
employment data and si,0  is the national share of each country (because we are interested in the 
within-country sectoral specialisation). Results are shown in Table A.5 in the Appendix.59 Apart 
from 1990 (the results for this year do not seem reliable), the index is falling everywhere, except in 
Poland (confirming the results of NUTS-2 analysis, but the increase is slight in any case), Lithuania 
and Latvia. In general, the tertiarisation forces are likely to explain to a large extent the 
homogenization of employment structures also in this sample of regions. 
 
5. Regional convergence, growth and institutional change: econometric investigations 
In order to ascertain more rigorously the links between regional convergence and the other 
relevant variables – spatial and structural characteristics, institutional change – we have carried out 
some regression analyses. The data are mainly taken from Cambridge Econometrics databank and 
from the EBRD Transition Report. 
                                                 
59 Since we have, for each year, as many KSIr as the total number of NUTS-3 regions (120), Table A.5  presents, for each country, 
the simple means of the regional KSIr. 
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The empirical analysis refers to the eight CEECs (joining the EU in 2004), for the period 
1990-2006. The territorial units are the NUTS-3 regions of Eurostat classification. The full sample 
of regions includes 120 NUTS-3 regions.60  
 
5.1 Income convergence of regions 
 It is well-known that the β-convergence approach implies the estimation of a regression of 
the following type: 
(ln yr,t – ln yr,0)/t  =  α + β ln yr,0 + γ xr,0 + ε 
i.e. a cross-section, for a sample of n regions (r=1,…,n), where the regional growth rate of per 
capita income (at constant prices) in a certain period (0, t) is regressed on the initial level of per 
capita income (yr,0). If the x’s (one or more) variables are not included, we talk of an absolute β-
convergence approach; otherwise, in a conditional β-convergence approach, the x’s may be some 
“structural” variables. In the latter case, convergence of each region is toward its own steady-state, 
characterised by such structural variable.61
 In our case, y is GDP per capita (in purchasing power parity, index number). Among the 
control variables x’s we include: 
• the synthetic EBRD index of institutional change, 
• some alternative structural variables (either KSI, the Krugman specialisation index, or the 
employment shares of specific sectors: agriculture, industry, services); 
• the DIS index of spatial concentration (of total value added)62. 
 The results of Table 7 show that, over the full period (1990-2006), there has been a 
satisfactory degree of absolute convergence (eq. 1.1), with high statistical significance. Considering 
now three distinct sub-periods (1990-1995, 1995-2000, 2000-2006), we can see (eqs. 1.2-1.4) that 
absolute convergence is confirmed in the first sub-period, then it becomes non significant in the 
second one, and in the most recent years a divergence appears (though not significant). 
 If we now add some country dummies (eqs. 1.7-1.10), convergence is again established for 
the full period, though the β coefficient is much smaller; a clear and significant divergence appears 
in the two last sub-periods, i.e. over the last ten years. The meaning is that if we control for the 
different rates of growth of various countries (in particular the Baltic states had higher growth 
rates), disparities across regions appear to be increasing, with poor regions worsening their position 
in relative terms, as already shown in Section 4. 
 Considering, at this stage, a more explicit β-conditional approach, we are first of all 
interested in the impact of the institutional variables. Thus, among the control variables (γ), we 
initially include the synthetic EBRD index. Eq. 1.11 reveals that for the full period this institutional 
variable has a positive effect on regional growth63 (and its statistical significance is satisfactory); on 
the other hand, the β coefficient is confirmed in its sign, numerical value and statistical significance. 
If we change the explanatory variable, by substituting the institutional index with a structural 
variable64, eqs. 1.16-1.19 show a positive value of the initial shares (in terms of employment)65 of 
both industry and the services. If we instead consider the change over time of such shares, while the 
services maintain a positive impact, industry reveals a negative effect on regional growth (the 
coefficients are always significant): it is possible that diversification in production, with a fall in the 
industrial share, had positive effects on growth, especially in heavily industrialised regions of the 
                                                 
60 The list of the 120 regions is available upon request; for certain regressions, the available data refer to 119 regions. 
61 In the initial studies: propensity to save, population growth, rate of technical progress, R&D expenditures, human capital 
endowments, etc. 
62 This index is equal for all regions of the same country. 
63 Regarding the direct and sole effect of EBRD index on regional growth (away from the convergence analysis), eq. 1.12 reveals a 
positive and significant effect (of course the goodness of fit of the regression is rather low). 
64 On the other hand, the geographical index of spatial concentration (DIS) is not in general significant. 
65 No improvement is achieved by considering the shares in terms of value added.  
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former planned economy; as regards the positive role of services, instead, we must recall the 
advantages of the leading areas of each country, in particular of capital cities (see section 4). 
 
Table 7  – Absolute and conditional beta convergence: GDP (ppp) per capita (1) 
γ, t-test (2) eq. periods β, t-test 
Instit. (3) Struct. (4) other (5) or 
dummies 
adj. R2 F-test 
1.1 
 
1990-2006 −0.91*** 
(24.1) 
   0.831 580.6 
1.2 
 
1990-1995 −0.94*** 
(29.9) 
   0.884 896.4 
1.3 
 
1995-2000 −0.05 
(0.5) 
   −0.006 0.3 
1.4 
 
2000-2006 0.07 
(0.7) 
   −0.004 0.5 
1.7 1990-2006 −0.31*** 
(3.3) 
  CD: EE+, LT+, 
LV+, SI+ 
0.891 194.3 
1.8 1990-1995 −0.05 
(0.9) 
  CD: EE+, LT+, 
LV+, SI+, CZ−, 
HU− 
0.979 799.5 
1.9 1995-2000 0.35*** 
(3.4) 
  CD:  SI−, CZ−, 
HU− 
0.283 12.6 
1.10 2000-2006 0.31*** 
(3.5) 
  CD:  EE+, LT+, 
LV+, HU+, 
SK+ 
0.285 8.9 
1.11 1990-2006 −0.89*** 
(23.3) 
ΔE: 0.10** 
(2.6) 
  0.839 307.8 
1.12 1990-2006  ΔE: 0.32*** 
(3.6) 
  0.094 13.2 
1.13 1990-1995 −0.93*** 
(31.1) 
ΔE: 0.11*** 
(3.6) 
  0.894 500.0 
1.14 1995-2000 0.08 
(0.8) 
ΔE: 0.30*** 
(3.1) 
  0.061 4.9 
1.15 2000-2006 0.19** 
(2.1) 
ΔE: 0.42*** 
(4.7) 
  0.152 11.6 
1.16 1990-2006 −0.92*** 
(25.4) 
 I:  0.12*** 
(3.5) 
 0.846 325.2 
1.17 1990-2006 −0.90*** 
(23.8) 
 ΔI: −0.09***
(2.4) 
 0.838 305.7 
1.18 1990-2006 −0.97*** 
(26.6) 
 S:  0.18*** 
(4.9) 
 0.859 359.8 
1.19 1990-2006 −0.92*** 
(25.0) 
 ΔS: 0.11*** 
(3.0) 
 0.842 315.0 
1.20 1990-2006 −0.94*** 
(14.1) 
ΔE: 0.08* 
(1.7) 
ΔS: 0.08** 
(2.1) 
ΔDIS: −0.06 
(0.8) 
0.843 159.7 
1.21 1990-1995 −0.97*** 
(20.5) 
ΔE: 0.13*** 
(3.2) 
ΔS: 0.02 
(0.7) 
ΔDIS: −0.06 
(1.1) 
0.894 248.8 
1.22 1995-2000 0.07 
(0.6) 
ΔE: 0.31*** 
(2.8) 
ΔS: 0.03 
(0.1) 
ΔDIS: −0.06 
(1.1) 
0.045 2.4 
1.23 2000-2006 0.27*** 
(2.9) 
ΔE: 0.26*** 
(2.6) 
ΔS: 0.06 
(0.6) 
ΔDIS:0.34*** 
(3.2) 
0.207 8.7 
(1) number of obs. 119 in all equations; (2) Δ means change of the variable in the period (otherwise initial 
levels); (3) E is the synthetic EBRD index; (4) A, I, S are the employment shares of the three sectors; (5) DIS is 
the spatial concentration coefficient, CD are country-dummies, TD are time-dummies (only the significant cases 
and their sign are reported). t-stat. in parentheses; significance levels: 1%***, 5%**, 10%* 
 
 Source: elaborations on Cambridge Econometrics and EBRD data 
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 A more general specification includes both institutional66 and structural variables, as well as 
the index of spatial concentration. For the full period (eq. 1.20), conditional β-convergence is once 
more established: the magnitude and significance level of the coefficient is an indication of the 
robustness of the results. However, the institutional variable is only partially significant, in addition 
to the change in the services’ share. As regard the single sub-periods (eqs. 1.21-1.23), convergence 
is established for the first period, lack of convergence is found in the second and (significant) 
divergence in the last one. Structural variables are not significant in general and the spatial 
concentration index (DIS) only in the last period: a possible interpretation is that concentration of 
production in a given country has favoured the growth of all its regions (but with rising income 
disparities as shown by the β-divergence). 
 
5.2 GDP and employment growth  
 This second type of analysis consists in explaining GDP growth of individual countries on 
the basis of institutional and structural variables; the latter should hopefully include also some 
regional features, such as the spatial concentration and sectoral specialisation of regions. Following 
this approach, we have tried to carry out some time-series regressions67 for each individual country, 
but the limited number of observations (17 or less) excludes the possibility to obtain any 
meaningful result. 
  To overcome this problem, we have attempted to estimate some pooled regressions (Table 
8). The EBRD index, included as the sole explanatory variable of GDP growth, turns out to be 
positive and significant (eq. 2.1); the addition of country dummies improves the estimation (eq. 
2.2)68; and the results are even better with time dummies (eq. 2.3), where the transitional recession 
of the early ‘90s (1991-93) is a clear outcome. 
 
Table 8  – GDP and employment growth: pooled regressions (1990-2006) (1) 
Explanatory vars, t-test (**) adj. R2 F-test eq. Dep. Var. 
GDP or other Instit. (2) dummies (3)   
2.1 
 
GDP growth
 (n=136)  
 0.66*** 
(10.1) 
 0.470 60.9 
2.2 
 
GDP growth
 (n=136)   
DIS:  0.73*** 
(3.8) 
0.44*** 
(5.0) 
CD: PL+, 
SK+, CZ+ 
0.509 29.0 
2.3 
 
GDP growth
 (n=136)   
 0.40*** 
(5.9) 
TD: 1991−, 
1992−, 
1993− 
0.611 43.5 
2.4 Empl.  
Growth 
 (n=132) 
 0.42*** 
(5.0) 
 0.170 14.4 
2.5 
 
Empl.  
Growth 
 (n=132)  
GDP: 0.54*** 
(5.1) 
0.05 
(0.5) 
 0.307 20.3 
2.6 
 
Empl.  
Growth 
 (n=132)  
GDP: 0.49*** 
(4.7) 
0.06 
(0.6) 
TD: 1993:− 0.331 17.2 
(1) dependent and explanatory variables as rate-of-change (but E and dummies); (2) E is the 
synthetic EBRD index; (3) CD are country-dummies, TD are time-dummies (only the significant 
cases and their sign are reported). 
t-stat. in parentheses; significance levels: 1%***, 5%**, 10%* 
 
Source: elaborations on Cambridge Econometrics and EBRD data 
 
                                                 
66 The synthetic index EBRD is used once more; we have tried to include, in its place, more specific indices (such as an index of 
enterprise restructuring, an index of competition policy, the number of years under the planned economy as initial condition), but the 
results are generally worse. 
67 By the way, the EBRD index turns out to be positive and significant in more than half of the eight countries. 
68 In this specification, also the DIS concentration index turns out to be significant, with a positive sign. 
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 A similar equation with employment growth as dependent variable confirms once more the 
positive effect of the institutional variable (EBRD), but the overall goodness of fit is rather low (eq. 
2.4). Then, if we add the GDP growth as explanatory variable, the degree of explained variance 
improves (eq. 2.5); with the dummies, only a dummy for the year 1993 comes out to be significant 
(eq. 2.6); unfortunately, the institutional variable is no more significant in the last two 
specifications. A possible reason is that institutional change caused simultaneous effects on both  
goods (GDP) and labour (employment) markets, so such effects probably cancelled out.  
 However, the coefficient of the GDP variable, which can be interpreted as the elasticity of 
employment to GDP69, is on average about 0.5. 
 In order to better analyse some key determinants of (national and regional) economic 
performance and some possible feedbacks, we are now developing some other econometric 
investigations, mainly through panel analysis (for the whole period and for selected sub-periods).  
 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper has analysed the main differences/similarities and dynamics in institutional 
frameworks, regional/sectoral features and aggregate performances in the eight transition countries 
that became EU members in May 2004 (8-CEECs). 
 As to the institutional processes, a partial review of the main theoretical and empirical 
literature on the “great transformation” (Kornai, 2006) has focused on the relationship between 
institutional change and aggregate performance as well as on the studies considering the regional 
features of the transition processes. Some stylized facts for the eight CEECs have been presented, 
by highlighting the main national differences and key characters of: (i) the initial conditions, (ii) the 
institutional changes and progress in transition and (iii) the aggregate performance (GDP growth 
and the rates of unemployment, employment and inflation).  
 Here we just recall that the “institutional jump” in the 8-CEECs – e.g. the private sector 
share on GDP initially at 5-10% (Poland at 30% was the exception), increased to more than 50% in 
3-5 years of transition and reached 70-80% in less than a decade – was accompanied and/or 
followed by: (i) huge (and different) GDP declines in the first years of transition; (ii) high (and, in 
some cases, persisting) unemployment rates; (iii) the prevailing, until recent years, of net job 
destructions; (iv) the persistence of different and significant gaps from the European employment 
objectives, with partial improvements in recent years; (v) very high (and differentiated) inflation 
rates in the first years of transition, with a (generally fast) price stabilisation; (vi) a sigma 
convergence in national per capita GDP, especially between the four small countries; (vii) a general 
persistence in disparities on unemployment, employment and inflation rates (as exceptions, sigma 
convergence dynamics are detected for the unemployment rates of the four small countries, since 
1994, and for the inflation rates in the first years of transition).  
 The empirical analysis of this paper focused also on some regional features of the transition 
process in this group of countries. Differently from previous research, in this paper we have 
employed, in a rather innovative way, a territorial breakdown in NUTS-3 level regions: the large 
number of regions (120) and the availability of spatially disaggregated variables for all the eight 
countries make more meaningful the statistical investigations. 
 A first definite result is the clear process of concentration of production and economic 
activities toward the leading regions of each country, coincident by and large with the capital cities. 
Not only was concentration of the services a likely phenomenon – although the extent found in this 
group of countries goes beyond the tendencies discovered in other areas of the world – but in the 
same leading regions a clustering of industrial activities was uncovered as well. The leading (and 
richest) regions benefit usually from large domestic markets, good market access to other countries, 
                                                 
69 As well known, the complex theoretical relationship between GDP growth and (un)employment changes has been largely debated 
in literature; in addition the empirical results on the elasticity of (un)employment to GDP are generally highly unstable over time and 
differentiated across countries and regions (e.g. Perugini and Signorelli 2005 and 2007). 
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the existence of advanced services, and the availability of “superior” resources (human capital, 
know how, research centers, public services, FDI attraction pools, good infrastructure, etc.). 
 In this context, regional convergence of per-capita incomes has been detected in the sample 
of 120 regions and for the full period, but only because of convergence between countries. At the 
same time, regional divergence has been found – coherently with the mentioned process of 
concentration – within countries. This has been revealed both by a simple sigma-convergence’s 
analysis and by some regressions following the well-known beta-convergence approach (in the 
regression with country dummies regional convergence becomes smaller and/or less significant). In 
any case, the general regional convergence’s result becomes non-convergence at the end of the ‘90s 
and a clear divergence in the recent years (since 2000). 
 This growth process has been supported, also at the regional level, by the institutional 
change, as confirmed by the significance of the institutional proxy (the EBRD synthetic transition 
index) in the regression analysis. Also in the regressions explaining GDP or employment growth – 
beyond the convergence investigations – the institutional variable is in most cases highly 
significant. 
 The results concerning the structural variables are more ambiguous, probably because of the 
generalized convergence that has occurred in regional specializations. However, it seems that 
growth has been higher in regions initially specialized both in industrial and tertiary activities; on 
the other hand, just an increase in specialization in the services (not in industry) is positive for 
growth. 
 Turning back to the trade-off between increasing disparities within countries and the 
catching-up of countries within Europe (i.e. between “equity” and “spatial efficiency”), this poses 
some important policy issues. According to some opinions70, efficiency considerations imply that 
policies should not alter the allocation of activities within countries (when the leading regions grow 
fast it is good for the whole country!), also because equity concerns may be wrongly based on the 
spatial distribution of activities (because of possible differences between spatial inequality and 
individual inequalities) and may be, in any case, tackled by appropriate policy tools (such as the 
fiscal transfers). Thus, European regional policies should be directed to the disparities between 
countries and to strengthen the catching-up process of the poorer countries (e.g. through the 
European Cohesion Fund). 
 In our view, there is still room for a genuine European regional policy, although different 
from the old one and following at least two directions.71 The first one would follow the lines of the 
Lisbon’s strategy72, in order to support growth, innovation, R&D, etc.: this support, if not dispersed 
in a myriad of projects, would be in many cases really helpful in the development of some 
backward regions. The second one is connected to the first but focuses on labour market problems 
and the implementation of the European Employment Strategy73 – especially its general and 
specific guidelines – in order to: (i) favour the restructuring processes also at the regional level, help 
the necessary adjustment in labour markets and alleviate the negative consequences (such as the 
possible rise of unemployment)74; (ii) sustain the increase of participation and employment rates, 
                                                 
70 See e.g. Martin (2006). 
71 The new Financial Perspectives (2007-2013) approved by the EU institutions go along the same lines, but in future a greater 
consideration for the efficiency concerns in the implementation of projects and more compelling efforts for a wiser allocation of 
funds (with reference to the still heavy burden of the Common Agricultural Policy) are crucial. 
72 As well known, the strategic European goal established at the Lisbon Council in 2000 for the following decade is: “to become the 
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better 
jobs and greater social cohesion”. 
73 As well known, the European Employment Strategy, an open-method of coordination of employment policies designed to enable 
the EU to achieve conditions for full employment, was launched in 1997 and became a key part of the Lisbon Strategy since 2000. 
The key idea of the EES is to favour an effective combination of “flexibility and security” and the financial instrument is the 
European Social Found. It is useful to recall that, in the last ten years, the EU-15 countries experienced an unexpected and 
generalised improvement in labour market performance, notwithstanding the low economic growth (see Perugini and Signorelli 
2007). For a discussion of the probable effects of the EES on European labour market performance, see also Perugini and Signorelli 
(2004). 
74 It is useful to recall that “addressing regional employment disparities” is an important guideline of the EES. 
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especially for women and elderly, and facilitate the access and permanence of young people in 
regular employment; (iii) enrich the process of exchange of information between EU member states 
and regions for a better assessment and transferability of “good practices”; (iii) uphold the 
investments in education and human capital, that according to most studies are a key factor for 
growth.75
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Appendix  
 
Table A1 - Population and geographical data 
 
Population  
(thousands) 
1990 (2006) 
Area 
(square km) 
 
Distance from 
Brussels 
km. 
PL 38,119 (38,224) 312,685 1,160 
HU 10,365 (9,854) 93,029 1,129 
CZ 10,363  (10,218) 78,860 718 
SK 5,291 (5,417) 49,035 971 
EE 1,569 (1,319) 45,228 1,599 
LV 2,663 (2283) 64,589 1,454 
LT 3,698 (3,397) 65,300 1,457 
SI 1,998 (1,999) 20,273 916 
Source: EBRD and The World Bank, History of Planned Economies, World Development Report (various issues).  
 
Table A2 - FDI and Portfolio investment restrictions index 
 
FDI 
restriction index1
1993-99 
Portfolio Investment
restriction index2 
1993-99 
PL 1.6 0.5 
HU 1.1 0.4 
CZ 0.3 0.1 
SK 0.8 0.6 
EE 0.0 0.0 
LV 1.4 0.0 
LT 2.8 0.0 
SI 1.8 0.7 
Source: calculated by Garibaldi, Mora, Sahay and Zettelmeyer (2001) based on Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Restrictions. 
Note: 1 The Foreign Direct Investment restriction index ranges from -0.2 to 6 where 6 reflects most restrictions.  
2 The Portfolio Investment restriction index ranges from 0 to 2 where 2 indicates outright prohibition of portfolio 
flows. 
Table A3 - Poland: EBRD index correlation matrix (1989-2006)  
 
 
Large scale 
privatisation 
 
Small scale 
privatisation 
Enterprise 
restructuring 
Price 
liberalisation 
Trade & 
Forex 
system 
Competi
tion 
Policy 
Banking 
reform & 
interest rate 
liberalisation 
Securities 
markets & 
non-bank 
financial 
institutions 
Overall 
infrastructure 
reform 
Large scale 
privatisation 1.0000         
Small scale 
privatisation 0.8901 1.0000        
Enterprise 
restructuring 0.9014 0.8989 1.0000       
Price liberalisation 0.8652 0.9353 0.8794 1.0000      
Trade & Forex 
system 0.9201 0.9505 0.9408 0.9423 1.0000     
Competition 
Policy 0.9067 0.9185 0.9853 0.9210 0.9646 1.0000    
Banking reform & 
interest rate 
liberalisation 
0.9282 0.9148 0.9841 0.9018 0.9548 0.9692 1.0000   
Securities markets 
& non-bank 
financial 
institutions 
0.9171 0.8451 0.8590 0.7967 0.8275 0.8506 0.8817 1.0000  
Overall 
infrastructure 
reform 
0.9106 0.8403 0.8705 0.8553 0.8413 0.8736 0.8954 0.9677 1.0000 
Source: elaboration on EBRD data 
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Table A4 - Concentration in capital cities (Population and Value added) 
 
            
country (*) capital city   1990 2000 2006 
      
CZ (14) Praha Pop 11,7% 11,5% 11,4% 
   tot GVA 16,4% 24,9% 27,6% 
   Agr 0,4% 1,0% 1,3% 
   Ind 8,7% 10,2% 10,8% 
    Serv 27,1% 37,0% 40,5% 
EE (5) Põhja-Eesti Pop 38,6% 38,4% 38,5% 
   tot GVA 48,7% 58,0% 61,1% 
   Agr 13,5% 15,2% 17,8% 
   Ind 48,6% 51,1% 50,5% 
    Serv 55,2% 66,3% 70,2% 
HU (20) Budapest Pop 19,5% 17,9% 16,4% 
   tot GVA 32,9% 35,2% 35,9% 
   Agr 1,8% 3,7% 4,8% 
   Ind 26,1% 23,3% 25,8% 
    Serv 40,5% 45,3% 44,8% 
LT (10) Vilniaus Pop 24,7% 24,4% 24,4% 
   tot GVA 23,9% 32,5% 38,7% 
   Agr 13,2% 13,3% 12,5% 
   Ind 21,0% 28,8% 33,5% 
    Serv 30,0% 37,9% 45,9% 
LV (6) Riga Pop 34,0% 32,1% 31,1% 
   tot GVA 37,2% 55,5% 63,8% 
   Agr 1,3% 9,4% 16,9% 
   Ind 43,5% 52,7% 54,6% 
    Serv 38,3% 62,6% 73,5% 
PL (45) Miasto Warszawa Pop 4,6% 4,4% 4,2% 
   tot GVA 7,2% 12,1% 14,8% 
   Agr 0,3% 0,1% 0,0% 
   Ind 5,2% 8,2% 11,2% 
    Serv 10,0% 15,1% 17,7% 
SI (12) Osrednjeslovenska Pop 24,2% 24,6% 24,9% 
   tot GVA 32,4% 34,4% 35,5% 
   Agr 14,1% 14,1% 14,6% 
   Ind 28,4% 25,5% 23,8% 
    Serv 37,0% 41,6% 44,8% 
SK (8) Bratislavský Pop 11,5% 11,4% 11,4% 
   tot GVA 19,6% 25,1% 26,8% 
   Agr 5,4% 7,3% 4,9% 
   Ind 13,9% 18,1% 17,6% 
    Serv 25,4% 30,9% 32,1% 
(*) number of regions in each country in parenthesis  
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Table A5 -  Krugman specialisation coefficient  
(country's means of regional coeff.s, based on employment, 3 sectors) 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
CZECH REP. 0,069 0,048 0,047 0,046 0,045 0,044 0,043 0,041 0,044 0,044 0,041 0,041 0,040 0,040 0,040 0,040 0,040
ESTONIA 0,161 0,117 0,115 0,109 0,103 0,087 0,087 0,086 0,081 0,074 0,075 0,071 0,071 0,067 0,065 0,063 0,061
HUNGARY 0,082 0,056 0,054 0,048 0,048 0,048 0,048 0,047 0,047 0,045 0,045 0,046 0,047 0,045 0,045 0,045 0,045
LITHUANIA 0,104 0,036 0,037 0,042 0,043 0,044 0,039 0,051 0,051 0,049 0,051 0,049 0,054 0,058 0,061 0,065 0,069
LATVIA 0,171 0,064 0,072 0,073 0,073 0,072 0,072 0,080 0,082 0,073 0,070 0,071 0,082 0,075 0,074 0,074 0,073
POLAND 0,142 0,064 0,064 0,065 0,067 0,066 0,066 0,066 0,067 0,070 0,071 0,072 0,075 0,076 0,076 0,076 0,076
SLOVENIA 0,128 0,036 0,033 0,031 0,030 0,029 0,026 0,026 0,026 0,024 0,023 0,022 0,021 0,021 0,021 0,021 0,021
SLOVAK REP. 0,089 0,023 0,021 0,019 0,018 0,016 0,015 0,012 0,012 0,012 0,011 0,010 0,009 0,008 0,008 0,009 0,009
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Source: EBRD data                                                                              
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Graph A3 - Poland: Transition Indexes
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Graph A4 - Hungary: Transition 
indexes
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Graph A5 - Czech Republic: 
Transition Indexes
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Graph A6 - Slovak Republic: 
Transition indexes
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Source: EBRD data 
Note: (i) large scale privatisation, (ii) small scale privatisation, (iii) enterprise restructuring, (iv) price liberalisation, (v) 
trade and foreign exchange system, (vi) competition policy, (vii) banking reform and interest rate liberalisation, (viii) 
securities markets and non-bank financial institutions, (ix) overall infrastructure reform. 
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Graph A7 - Estonia: Transition indexes
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Graph A8 - Latvia: Transition indexes
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Graph A9 - Lithuania: Transition indexes
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Graph A10 - Slovenia: Transition 
indexes
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Source: EBRD data 
Note: (i) large scale privatisation, (ii) small scale privatisation, (iii) enterprise restructuring, (iv) price liberalisation, (v) 
trade and foreign exchange system, (vi) competition policy, (vii) banking reform and interest rate liberalisation, (viii) 
securities markets and non-bank financial institutions, (ix) overall infrastructure reform. 
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 Graph A11 - Female Employment rates
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Graph A12 - Female Employment rates
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Graph A13 - 55-64 Employment rates
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Graph A14 - 55-64 Employment rates
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Graph A15 - Net Job creation/destruction (annual % changes in employment)
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Graph A16 - Net job creation/destruction (annual % changes in employment)
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Graph A17 - Inflation rates 1995-2006
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Graph A18 - Inflation rates 1995-2006
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Graph A19 - Disparities in national female employment rates 
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Source: our elaboration on Source: Eurostat data.  
Note: 4-big = Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovak Republic; 4-small = Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Slovenia. 
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Graph A20 - Disparities in national 55-64 employment rates 
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Source: our elaboration on Source: Eurostat data .  
Note: 4-big = Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovak Republic; 4-small = Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Slovenia. 
Graph A21  
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 Source: our elaborations on Cambridge Econometrics data  
 
Graph A22 
Per capita income of EU transition countries (small)
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 Source: our elaborations on Cambridge Econometrics data  
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Graph A23 
Regional concentration of Value Added - NUTS3 regions
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Graph A24 
Regional concentration of Value Added - NUTS3 regions
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 Source: our elaborations on Cambridge Econometrics data  
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Graph A26-A33: Growth and Employment76
Graph A25 - Poland
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Graph A26 -Hungary
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Graph A27 - Czech Republic
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Graph A28 - Slovak Republic
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Source: EBRD data 
                                                 
76 Data represent official estimates of out-turns as reflected in publications from the national authorities, the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank and other sources. As for GDP growth and employment changes, 2005 data are EBRD staff estimates and 
2006 data are projection. GDP growth rates can lack precision in the context of transition due to large shifts in relative prices, the 
failure to account for quality improvements and the substantial size and change in the informal sector. Some countries have started to 
incorporate the informal sector into their estimates of GDP. For most countries, employment data reflect official employment records 
from the labour registries. In many countries, small enterprises are not recorded by official data. A number of countries have moved 
towards ILO-consistent labour force surveys in recording changes in labour force, employment and unemployment. Where available 
these data are presented. 
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 Graph A29 - Slovenia
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Graph A30 - Estonia
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Graph A31 - Latvia
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Graph A32 - Lithuania
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Source: EBRD data 
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